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1Introduction
Historically, farm exit has been a controversial policy matter arising from economic development
in many countries. The general macro-level causes are clear enough and transcend commodities.
Technical innovations have allowed substitution of physical assets for physical effort. There has
also been increasing emphasis on human capital formation and growth in opportunities for more
educated labor elsewhere in modern economies (Huffman and Evenson 2001; Gardner 2002;
Federico 2005).
But the adjustments have been difficult, as they have often resulted in shattered hopes of
continuity for family businesses, family ties, and community cohesion (Lobao and Meyer 2001).
In part, agricultural commodity subsidies and other forms of protection from market forces can be
seen as attempts to cope with or even avoid these adjustments. More direct structural policies
have been used in the European Union, including farm retirement programs (Väre and Heshmati
2004). Other policies in the United States have had some influence on farm structure through
subsidized loan opportunities, public R&D, and education, although their effects are somewhat
mixed for crop and livestock enterprises (Huffman and Evenson 2001).
Closer inspection of the farm exit decision reveals finer details. Kimhi and Lopez (1999) are
among many that point to the importance of the typically joint decision on when to retire by the
older generation and whether to continue the business by the younger generation. Kimhi and
Bollman (1999) for the Canadian Atlantic Provinces, Kimhi (2000) for Israel in the 1970s,
Huffman and Evenson (2001) for the United States (for 1950-82), and Breustedt and Glauben
(2007) for early-member EU countries identify part-time farming as a means of stabilizing a farm
business and adjusting to economic change rather than preparation for eventual exit. Weiss
(1999), with farm-level data for Austria during the 1980s, and Goetz and Debertin (2001), with
county-level continental U.S. data over 1987-97, find that the issue is not clear-cut.
Policy can affect the rate of exit. With reference to Finnish policies, Pietola, Väre, and
2Lansink (2003) have confirmed that access to retirement benefits can be effective in promoting
exit. Foltz (2004) shows that U.S. dairy price policies have reduced the rate of dairy farm exit in
Connecticut over 1997-2001. Key and Roberts (2006) find that larger government payments, in
the form of more base acres, have had a small but statistically significant effect in facilitating U.S.
cash grain farm survival over 1982-97. Subsidies and high prices have also slowed exit in
Western European countries (Breustedt and Glauben 2007).
The survival struggle has been telling for U.S. hog producers in recent years. For most of the
twentieth century, U.S. hog production had a stable structure that adapted incrementally.
Production was small scale, especially in the Corn Belt where most hogs were grown. Typically, a
hog enterprise complemented corn and soybean cropping in labor demand and on-farm feed use.
Hogs were marketed at auction to the highest bidder where growers had no special relationship
with any purchaser. Despite early warnings by some who surveyed the move toward tightly
integrated poultry and egg sectors over 1930-60, e.g., Thomas (1958), the system endured.
Since about 1990, however, the U.S. hog industry has seen major restructuring. The net rate
of hog enterprise exits has outpaced those of grain farms and beef farms over the period 1992-97
(Hoppe and Korb 2006). According to National Agricultural Statistics Service data (NASS 2008),
the number of U.S. farms with hogs declined at an annual rate of 13.5% over 1992-97 and at an
annual rate of 6.25% over 1997-2007. The declines were concentrated in farms with smaller
inventory (< 2,000 head inventory), while the number of farms with larger inventory rose from
1992 to 2007. The percentage of inventory held on farms with inventory size 2,000 has risen
from 28.5% in 1992 to 81.5% in 2007.
While contract production has always had a place in agriculture, its significance in hog
production has been growing in the United States and elsewhere (MacDonald and Korb 2006;
Schultz, Spiller, and Theuvsen 2006; Boger 2001). Indeed full vertical integration similar to that
in U.S. poultry production has been discerned by some (including Smithfield, the major packer)
3as a very real possibility on the near horizon (Reimer 2006). The percentage of hogs sold on the
negotiated, or spot, market has declined from 62% in 1994 to 9.2% in 2008 (Grimes and Plain
2008).
In short, the U.S. hog industry has undergone a fundamental transformation between 1990
and 2007. Features of contracting that affect survival prospects include changes in risk exposures,
business activities and investment requirements, as well as technology transfer. Not only do
contracts secure markets for the contract duration but also they often specify production practices
and involve investments by both parties with low salvage value outside the relationship. While
generating tension in the bargaining process, these relationship-specific investments can increase
surplus through enhancing product revenue so that both parties can gain from the relationship.
Formal analysis leans heavily toward efficiency motives for the shift toward hog contracting (Key
and McBride 2003, 2007; Paul, Nehring, and Banker 2004; Paul et al. 2004) but has been less
clear on what it is that enables contracts to be more efficient.1
Transactions costs and other possible efficiency motives for the adoption of contract
governance forms have been overviewed in Hennessy and Lawrence (1999), Martinez (2002), and
MacDonald et al. (2004). Coordination efficiencies concern product quality, search cost
economies, and enhanced throughput in processing, among other items. Data are not generally
available to identify what contributes to the efficiency gains. For this, there is a need for data from
within the firm. Examples in other sectors where such data have proven useful include work on
the organization of the trucking (Baker and Hubbard 2004) and valve-making sectors (Bartel,
Ichniowski, and Shaw 2004). In agriculture, farm-level survey data provide better opportunities to
peer more closely at firm activities and motives for them.
1 Other important dimensions to this fundamental transformation exist. For example, Roberts and
Key (2005) argue that contract production threatens spot market production in another way. A
decline of liquidity in spot markets may precipitate further exits from these markets as price
discovery declines, growers face more risks and poorer quality market signals, and spot market
support infrastructure decays.
4Using 1998 and 2004 ARMS hog survey data, Key and McBride (2003, 2007) have
concluded that unobservable variables drive both potential cost efficiency and the decision to
contract. For given inputs and farm characteristics, they find that contracting can increase output
productivity by about 20% (Key and McBride 2003). These efficiency gains include enhanced
feed, labor, and capital productivity. Contracting growers may also tend to be ones possessed of
inherent characteristics associated with high productivity, so selection needs to be controlled for if
the effects of contracting on cost efficiency are to be identified.
In this article we look at another part of the same story, namely, contracts, exits, and how
they interact. We know that farm-level hog production occurs in an intensely competitive
marketplace. The switch to contracting by any given grower generally provides substantial gains
in unit production cost efficiency but comes at an investment cost. If farm enterprises that choose
not to contract are also, in general, innately less efficient, then their prospects for persistence
cannot be promising in a sector with a 6% annual rate of net exit. Are those choosing not to
contract also reconciled to letting their business wither away toward low profitability and then
termination?
Gillespie and Eidman (1998), Key (2005), and Davis and Gillespie (2007) suggest a less
pessimistic possibility by estimating a positive non-pecuniary premium for autonomy.
Independent production may preserve private utility that producers derive directly from having
control over marketing and production decisions. An alternative explanation concerns the
producers’ “alocative ability,”the ability to perceive changes in economic conditions and
respond efficiently (Schultz 1975; Huffman 1977). Retaining independent production may offer
better opportunities to exercise the skills associated with ability to allocate resources efficiently
and respond efficiently to change in economic conditions. Independent producers also preserve
bargaining strength that may become eroded as ties between contractor and contractee increase
after signing a contract. Feeling that the era of non-contract production is passing, some may
5conclude that they would, on balance, prefer autonomy even if it threatens survival. A better
understanding of determinants of exit requires information on what firms believe about their
prospects and how they behave. If growers anticipate near-term exit then they may state this and
they may reveal it in their contracting behavior.
This article provides three variants on a model of how exit expectations and contract
decisions are made. These models explain how production scale and expenditures on protecting
against business hazard risks can vary with the contract decision. They also explain how all these
decisions enter the formation of expectations concerning the exit date. The models differ only in
how innate farm cost efficiencies are represented. In one version, farms differ by their innate
capacity to survive over time. In the other two, farms differ by unit cost efficiency and the fixed
costs of switching to contract production. In all cases, it is shown that innately more productive
farms tend to contract. These results provide theoretical underpinnings for the selection model
approach taken and empirical results identified in Key and McBride (2003, 2007).
Our models suggest that contract production, high expectations that the enterprise will
survive beyond any specified time horizon, and certain protective production decisions should be
positively related to each other. As such our work can be placed in the larger literatures on
industrialization and organizational economics. Hog contracts are, at least in some part, about
extending downstream control over raw materials and recognizing the importance of process
control. Packers seek to develop brand capital, invest in quality protecting assets, glean
economies from efficient processing, and benefit when their raw materials are of good and
consistent quality. There are technological complementarities in the manner of Milgrom and
Roberts (1990). In short, access to downstream surplus has seeped upstream largely through
contracts, but only the more efficient growers have found it more profitable to sign on. The others
do not see the benefits but face growing output price pressure, and so the profit wedge has
widened between the more efficient and those at the margin.
6We estimate a recursive bivariate probit model on 2004 ARMS hog survey data in order to
control for a variety of observed variables that could possibly explain the relations. Our results
confirm that the decision to contract increases expected survival beyond any given time horizon.
We also find that more education tends to reduce the extent of contracting while increasing the
self-assessed probability of exit in 10 years. Older production facilities have the same effects.
More years in hog production is found to reduce the incentive to contract. Both producer age and
participation in off-farm work increase the perceived probability of exit. When compared with the
region dominated by North Carolina, other regions are less likely to contract and, by extension,
more likely to exit. These results can all be rationalized by appealing to intuitive structure on
grower cost attributes, skills, and preferences. There follows a discussion of these results and
what they convey about the forces forming the future structure of the hog sector. We conclude
with suggestions on directions for further research.
Model
The intent of this section is to show how unobservable efficiency in hog management can induce
a positive dependence between the contract decision and exit intentions. To demonstrate that the
suggested relationship is robust, we will study three distinct ways for this capability effect to
originate. Regardless of contracting choice, it can reduce the farm’s failure risk, as represented by 
a hazard function. Also regardless of contracting choice, it can reduce the unit cost of production.
It can also reduce the fixed cost of taking up the contract production business format.
At the present time, 0t , a grower uncertain about enterprise survival makes three choices.
One is whether to engage in contracting, and another is scale of production. The third choice
involves a protective input that affects the survival rate. This input could maintain enterprise
capacity to a) biosecure against a disease outbreak, b) manage odor or water emissions, or c)
ensure financial liquidity. One view of this input is as an indicator choice variable for process
7control, including control of production processes, interactions with the natural environment, and
financial consequences.
For a non-contracting grower the one-time present value capital cost of producing q hogs per
unit time is ( ) :C q    , where  is the set of closed positive reals. This cost function is
held to be twice continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly convex. Absent the cost of a
survival protection input, the net benefit per unit output per unit time is 0 . Survival to time
point t  is given by
(1) 1 1( ; , ) 1 ( ; , ),S t z x F t z x
where 31( ; , ) :F t z x    is the probability of failure to time t . Variable 1z is an exogenous
attribute concerning managerial ability that increases the business survival rate. Variable x 
represents expenditure per unit time on the protective input. More of it increases the survival rate,
or 1( ; , ) 0xS t z x  where the subscript denotes differentiation. While the variable is continuous
throughout our work, the analysis follows through when x is discrete so it might be viewed as an
indicator to denote a discrete technology choice.
With 1 1( ; , ) ( ; , )tF t z x f t z x as the failure density function, the hazard rate is
(2) 1 11
1
( ; , ) Ln[ ( ; , )]
( ; , ) ,
( ; , )
f t z x d S t z x
t z x
S t z x dt
  
which is assumed to be constant with form
(3) 1 1( ; , ) ( ); ;t z x h y y z x   
where 0 and ( ) 0yh y  . An increase in either 1z or x increases the survival probability for
any given future time. In addition, it is assumed that ( ) 0yyh y  to reflect decreasing returns to the
survival protection input. The linearity of aggregator y implies that input x is a perfect substitute
for exogenous attribute 1z . For example, expenditures on reliable information, veterinary or other
8biosecurity inputs, or more regular manure lagoon patrols may substitute for unobservable
managerial ability. Integrate (2) to obtain a survival function of form ( )1( ; , )
h y tS t z x e .
A second source of variation is attribute 2z , the negative of which enters as a variable cost in
production under contract. This might regard input purchasing skills or feed conversion
efficiency. It reduces unit cost in proportion to production, and so 2z q enters as a reduction in
cost (or increase in benefit) per unit time in production. The third source of variation is a fixed
cost associated with entering contract production. Fixed costs may be required to learn a new
production paradigm, or to comply with animal welfare regulations needed to sell into markets the
contractor has lined up.
Net benefit per unit time the firm survives is 2( )x z q  , where of course no optimal x will
ever exceed 2z . With continuous time discount rate r , the non-contracting firm’s expected
present value is
(4)
( )
1 2 ( , ) 2 ( , ) 1 20
2
1 2 1 2 1 2
1
( , ) max ( ) ( ) max ( , , ; , );
( , , ; , ) ( , ; , ) ( ); ( , ; , ) ;
( )
nc rt h y t
x q x qt
V z z x z qe e dt C q x q z z
x z
x q z z x z z q C q x z z
r h z x
 
  

  

    
    
 

with attribute-conditioned optimization vector 1 2 1 2( ( , ), ( , ))
nc ncx z z q z z .
Turning to the contracting grower, she accrues benefit per hog per time unit of , 0 , in
addition to . This may be due to sharing some of the surplus from improved contract inputs,
better information flows to the contractor concerning the quality and consistency of hog genetics,
better information on production practices, improved access to veterinary services, transactions
cost efficiencies in procuring hogs, or technical efficiencies in scheduling hog slaughter (General
Accounting Office 1999). Or it may be a premium offered to assist in inducing productive types
to contract. But this gain comes at the expense of a one-time investment cost of 3z per hog where
this cost may be required to support transactions cost efficiencies and contract stipulated
9production practices.
So the contracting farm’s value is given by
(5)
( )
1 2 3 ( , ) 2 30
( , ) 1 2 3
1 2 3 1 2 3
2
1 2
1
( , , , ) max ( ) ( )
max ( , , ; , , );
( , , ; , , ) ( , , ; , ) ( ) ;
( , , ; , ) ;
( )
c rt h y t
x q t
x q
V z z z x z qe e dt C q z
x q z z z
x q z z z x q z z q C q z
x z
x q z z
r h z x
  
 
   
  

  

     
 
    
    
 

with attribute-conditioned optimization vector 1 2 1 2( ( , , ), ( , , ))
c cx z z q z z  . Heterogeneity source 3z
enters only through the decision to contract or not. The attributes follow the joint distribution
1 2 3( , , ) : [0,1]G z z z Z  where 1 2 3[0, ] [0, ] [0, ]Z z z z  
   and, for convenience, we assume the
distribution has a density function. Notice that each iz is assumed to have lower support value 0.
This is at no loss of generality, as an alternative lower support value can be subsumed into ( )h 
for 1z , or for 2z . In the case of 3z , the marginal density can be assumed to be zero over the
relevant range.
The proof of Proposition 1 to follow demonstrates that contracting growers live in a set
1 2 3( , , )U z z z that satisfies the following monotonicity condition, labeled M: 1 2 3( , , )z z z
1 2 3( , , )U z z z implies 1 2 3 1 2 3( , , ) ( , , )z z z U z z z for all 1 2 3( , , )z z zsatisfying 1 1 2 2 3 3, ,z z z z z z      .
Notice the reversal in direction for fixed contracting cost 3z . The following is demonstrated in
supplemental materials available upon request.
Proposition 1. When compared with non-contracting growers, contracting growers i) live in a set
satisfying the monotonicity condition M; ii) produce more; and iii) have a lower probability of
quitting by any arbitrarily chosen time [0, )T  .
Since 1z , 2z , and 3z may not be entirely observable, one interpretation of part i) is as a
rationalization of the selection model approach taken in Key and McBride (2003) to control for
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productivity-related contract selection bias. A noteworthy feature of managerial heterogeneities
1z and 2z , but not 3z , is that they do not arise from the contract decision per se. Rather, the
higher return on contracting, or 0 , means growers with higher 1z or 2z find contracting to be
comparatively more remunerative. This is because, even when not under contract, these growers
produce more when in production and/or have a lower business hazard risk. The act of contracting
further increases their incentive to produce and also to protect their business. So the relatively
prosperous are best positioned to gain from opportunities to contract. A further observation is in
order and is shown in supplementary materials:
Remark 1. For any given vector of grower attribute values 1 2 3( , , )z z z , a contracting farm i) uses
more of the protective input, or 1 2 1 2( , , ) ( , )
c ncx z z x z z ; ii) exhibits a lower hazard rate, or
1 2 1 2[ ( , , )] [ ( , )]
c nch y z z h y z z  ; and iii) produces more, or 1 2 1 2( , , ) ( , )c ncq z z q z z .
So the model suggests that contracting leads to larger scale and greater control over processes.
These features of agricultural industrialization have been noted since at least Urban (1991) and
Drabenstott (1994). Given the three ways in which we have allowed growers to differ, the
theoretical impact of contracting on expected enterprise survival would appear to be robust.
Data and Empirical Framework
We apply our theoretical model to U.S. feeder pig-to-finish hog operations. We investigate the
determinants of exit and contracting decisions in those operations with a focus on the impact of
operation and operator’s characteristics. Data used are from the USDA’s 2004 ARMS Phase II, 
Hogs Production Practices and Costs and Returns Report. Covering a cross-section of U.S. hog
operations, the survey collects information on farm operators and farm financial characteristics as
well as on production practices and facilities (Key and McBride 2007). Hog farms were chosen
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from a list of farm operations maintained by USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Services 
(NASS). Survey data had 1,198 responses from 19 states.
Phase III of the survey for hogs asked two questions relevant to studying how contracting and
exit intentions interact. One, question 3 in Section N, was “Under what type of production
arrangement was [sic] hogs produced on this operation in 2004?”where the respondent could
choose among four types (production contract, independent, cooperative, more than one type). We
assigned 1 to the first response and 0 to the other three responses, giving our contracting data. The
other question, question 5 in that section, was “How many more years do you expect this
operation wil be producing hogs?”This gives our survival indicator data.
As there are broad differences in production techniques among different types of hog
operations, we limit our study to feeder pig-to-finish hog operations. Feeder pig-to-finish hog
operations were defined to be those on which 75% of feeder pigs were obtained from outside the
operation and then finished to a slaughter weight of 225-300 pounds; more than 75% of the value
of hogs and pigs left through market hog sales or contract removals. This group of operations has
experienced rapid growth, increasing from 19% of total hog operations in 1998 to 40% of total
hog operations in 2004. In the meantime, the share of hogs produced under contract in this group
of operations has increased from 22% in 1998 to 73% in 2004 (Key and McBride 2007).
We deleted all observations with missing values, leaving a total of 420 observations.
Variables used are presented in table 1; summary statistics of all variables are presented in table 2.
Apart from providing labels and explanations, table 1 assigns types to variables as one among
Endogenous, entering the Exit equation only, entering the Contract equation only, or entering
Both. As sampling weights were used to account for the survey design, survey population means
instead of sample means are reported in table 2.
Of the 420 hog operations in the data set, 275 (65%) were producing hogs under contract and
227 (54%) were expecting to exit within the next 10 years (i.e., 10T  ). The dependent variables
12
for the exit and contracting equations are respectively 1 1y  if the hog operation was expecting to
exit in the next 10 years and 0 otherwise, and 2 1y  if the hog operation was under production
contract and 0 if otherwise (i.e., hog production on the operation was independent). Without
conditioning on relevant attributes, the mean of the exit indicator for contracting farms is 0.462
while it is 0.687 for independent producers. The raw responses suggest a strong interaction
between the two.
Among independent variables, the size of the hog operations is categorized into four groups:
Size 1 with less than 500 hogs through Size 4 with over 5,000 hogs. The dummy variable for each
size group (Size1, Size2, Size3, and Size4) is equal to 1 if the operation has the corresponding
number of hogs and 0 otherwise. And we divided the hog operation locations into five
geographical regions: East (including North Carolina), South, North, West, and Midwest
(including Iowa). Contracting was least common in the West and most common in the East.
Dummy variables for these regions are set equal to 1 if the operation is located in the
corresponding region and 0 otherwise.
Another explanatory variable, VPHog, is used to indicate specialization and is defined as the
proportion of value from hog production ina farm’s total value of production. On average,
contracted operations had larger values of this variable than did independent operations. The
variable Facilities Age indicates the average age of the hog operation’s facilities/buildings since 
last remodeled. And Years measures years of the operation in the business of producing hogs. Off-
farm has value 1 if the operator and/or spouse worked off-farm for wages or a salary in 2004.
Education and Age denote the education level and age of the hog farm operator, respectively.
Operators who expected to exit in the next 10 years tended to be more educated and older than
those who did not.
To investigate the impacts of operator and operation’s characteristics on exit expectations and
the contracting decision, we set up a recursive bivariate probit model (Heckman 1978; Maddala
13
1983; Rhine, Greene, and Toussaint-Comeau 2006), in which one of the binary dependent
variables (the contracting decision) is an endogeneous regressor in the other equation (exit
equation). The bivariate recursive probit model for our analysis is set up as follows:
(6)
*
* 1
1 1 2 1 1
*
* 2
2 2 2 2
1 if 0,
Exit : ,
0 otherwise;
1 if 0,
Contract : ,
0 otherwise;
y
y X y y
y
y X y
  
 
    

   

with estimates ˆ, ˆ, and ˆ. Here, *1y and *2y are the latent variables for exit intentions and the
contract decision, respectively, while and are transpose vectors for regression parameters
to be estimated. The recursive specification is in the manner of Greene (1998). Thus, contracting
is held to affect exit expectations but exit expectations are not conditioned on contracting. We
think this is reasonable as the contract decision is likely to be more discretionary than the exit
decision, where the latter may be due to on-going health status or want of a successor.2
Data matrix 1X , the set of all exogenous variables on the right-hand side of the first equation,
includes operator’s age, off-farm work, operator’s education level, facilities age, and hog
operation’s size (see table 1). Data matrix 2X , the set of all exogenous variables on the right-hand
side of the second equation, includesyears the hog operation has been in the business, operation’s 
level of specialization in hog production,operation’s location, operator’s education level,
facilities age, andoperation’s size.
The reasoning behind this type of variable assignment is that Education, Facilities Age, and
Size are likely to be important in both decisions. A production contract may be viewed as a
substitute for certain types of education, while education also determines off-farm retirement
preferences and off-farm employment options. Smaller operations with older fixed capital are
2 A square model with 1y also as an explanatory variable in the contract equation is not well
posed and cannot be estimated (Maddala 1983).
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generally unlikely to be attractive partners for integrators and also face relatively larger
investments in order to increase the probability of survival beyond any given threshold.
A variable representing years in the hog business has been included in the Contract equation
as it is intended to capture inertia in organizational form. The specialization variable VPHog is
placed in the Contract equation as it identifies a need for revenue stability, but we see no strong
link with exit incentives. Given historical geographical patterns in contracting, geographic
indicators are more appropriately placed in the Contract equation. Operator Age has been placed
in the Exit equation as it is likely to have a direct influence on exit expectations through bringing
the labor force retirement decision closer. Engaging in Off-farm work is also likely to have a
direct influence on exit because it provides direct evidence of outside employment options and
higher returns from off-farm work. While size is endogenous in our theoretical model and in
reality, we have controlled for it as an exogenous variable. This is because including it in a joint
estimation with the Exit and Contract equations is too ambitious to hope for meaningful results
given the complexities of estimating the bivariate probit in itself.
As for the connections with the heterogeneity vector 1 2 3( , , )z z z , the heterogeneous component
of fixed costs of contracting, 3z , is likely to depend on geographic location, extent of
specialization, and operator years in the hog business. These we have modeled as entering the
Contract equation, and not entering the Exit equation. This fixed cost component, 3z , should also
depend on facilities age in both equations. The heterogeneous component of unit production costs,
2z , whether in a contract or not, depends on the extent of specialization. The specialization
variable, VPHog, is included in the Contract equation only. The unit production costs might also
depend on facilities age and on education, and both of these variables are included in both the
Contract and Exit equations. Hazard rate heterogeneity 1z should also depend on the facilities age
and education variables.
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The error terms 1 and 2 are assumed to be bivariate normal, located and scaled to satisfy
(7) 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
[ | , ] [ | , ] 0; Var[ | , ] Var[ | , ] 1;
Corr[ , | , ] .
E X X E X X X X X X
X X
   
 
   

This specification is as in Greene (2003), and the model was estimated by maximum likelihood
methods. The probability terms that enter the log-likelihood are
(8)
 
 
 
 
1 2 2 1 2
1 2 2 1 2
1 2 2 1 2
1 2 2 1 2
Pr( 1, 1) , , ,
Pr( 1, 0) , , ,
Pr( 0, 1) , , ,
Pr( 0, 0) , , ,
y y X X
y y X X
y y X X
y y X X
  
  
  
  
   
    
     
    
where 2 ( ) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate normal distribution.
Estimation
The estimation results are reported in table 3. To measure goodness of fit, we calculated
McFadden’s likelihood ratio index, 
0
Ln( )
1 ,
Ln( )
L
LRI
L
  where Ln( )L is the likelihood ratio of the
unrestricted model and 0Ln( )L is that where all slopes in the model are restricted to have value
zero. This index is bounded between zero and 1 and analogous to the 2R in a conventional
regression. The LRI for our model is 0.320. The model correctly predicts 294 of 420, or 70%, of
expected exit status by year 10; and 330 of 420, or 78.6%, of contracting decisions.
As shown in table 3, all parameter estimates are significant except Size2 in the contract
equation. The coefficient on Contract in the Exit equation is -0.204 and is statistically significant
(α = 0.01). This result supports Proposition 1, part iii), that contract producers should express a
lower probability of exit over any given time horizon. Noteworthy too are a) the positive relation
between size and contract, b) the negative direct relation between size and exit expectations, and
c) the negative indirect relation between size and exit expectations through the Contract indicator
in the Exit equation. Point a) supports Proposition 1, part ii). Together, points a) through c)
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support part iii) as well because they confirm that size, longevity, and contracting come as a
mutually reinforcing package.
The other terms generally support Proposition 1, part i). Consider Facilities Age. Both directly
and indirectly, older facilities increase the exit probability. These facilities likely have higher unit
costs and so are likely not in the set of producer characteristics for which contracting is optimal.
The Education variable is an exception in that it is not consistent with this reading of part i). To
some extent, this is because Proposition 1 deals only with the supply side whereas education also
has demand-side effects. But also, the role of education is multifaceted, and, with the available
data, we measure only general education and not occupation-specific education. We defer further
discussion on education until a later juncture.
The estimated value of correlation between the two structural disturbances,, is 0.142 with a
t statistic of 4.38 (table 3). Both the Wald statistic for the hypothesis 0 and likelihood ratio
statistic for the same hypothesis (where the log likelihood with 0 is 0Ln( )L and that with
unrestricted is Ln( )L ) also support the conclusion that the null hypothesis 0 should be
rejected (table 3).
Average Marginal Effects
The absolute scale of the coefficients in a binary choice model gives a distorted picture of the
response of the dependent variable to a change in one of the stimuli because the model is actually
of a probability. Therefore, it is customary to estimate the marginal effects of the explanatory
variables on the probability of observing a certain outcome. Understanding how hog producers
respond to marginal changes of some features is important to an analysis of the recent structural
changes in the hog industry. However, little is known about how marginal changes in particular
hog producer and operation characteristics can alter hog producers’contracting decisions and exit
expectations.
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The calculation of marginal effects depends on whether the explanatory variable in question is
binary or continuous. In addition, the explanatory variables that appear in the contract equation
can have two effects on exit expectations. They can have a direct effect if they appear in the Exit
equation. They can also have an indirect effect through changing the probability of contracting.
The marginal effect of a change in a variable is the sum of these effects. Greene (1998) has shown
how to calculate marginal effects in a recursive bivariate probit model for the special case in
which 0 is assumed. In the recursive bivariate probit model with the presence of correlation,
our case given the table 3 tests, the calculation of the marginal effects is more complicated. The
method we propose to calculate marginal effects for the bivariate probit model with 0
improves and corrects that used in earlier studies (e.g., Christofides, Stengos, and Swidinsky
1997; Christofides, Hardin, and Swidinsky 2000). We have placed the more involved steps of our
analytical derivations for marginal effects and their standard errors for a recursive bivariate probit
model with the presence of correlation in the appendix for interested readers.
Consider first the exit variable 1y . Using (8), the conditional mean is
(9)    
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
[ | , ] Pr( 1) [ | , , 1] Pr( 0) [ | , , 0]
Pr( 1, 1) Pr( 1, 0) , ; , ; .
E y X X y E y X X y y E y X X y
y y y y X X X X     
     
             
Because a variable in the exit equation may also appear in the contracting equation, the marginal
effect of a change in a variable in the exit equation will be the sum of the direct effect (the effect
of a change in that variable on the probability that 1 1y  given the value of 2y ) and the indirect
effect (the effect of the variable on the probability that 2 1y  , which, in turn, affects the
probability that 1 1y  ). Thus, for 1y , the marginal effect of a continuous explanatory variable, u ,
which might appear in 1X and/or 2X , is
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(10)    
   
1 1 2
2 1 1 2
1 12 2
1 2 1 2
2 22 2
[ | , ]
( )
1 1
1 1
direct effect
u
dE y X X
du
X X X X
X X
X X X X
X X
       
 
      
 

                  
         
                  
        

.
indirect effect
u



where the first part of the equation is the direct effect and the second part, the indirect effect.
Here, ( )is the standard normal density function with distribution ( )while u and u are the
coefficients on variable u in the two equations. Depending on the variable in question, one of u
or u may have value zero.
For a binary variable {0,1}m , which might appear in 1X and/or 2X , the marginal effect is
(11)
   
   
1 1 2 1 1 2
2 \ 1\ \ 2\ 2 \ 1\ \ 2\
2 \ 1\ \ 2\ 2 \ 1\ \ 2\
[ | , , 1] [ | , , 0]
, , , ,
, , , ,
direct effect
m m m m m m m m m m m m
m m m m m m m m m m
E y X X m E y X X m
X X X X
X X X X
         
       
   
                            
   
   
 
2 \ 1\ \ 2| 2 \ 1\ \ 2\
2 \ 1\ \ 2\ 2 \ 1\ \ 2\
2 \ 1\ \ 2\
, , , ,
, , , ,
, ,
indirect effect
m m m m m m m m m m
m m m m m m m m
m m m m m m
X X X X
X X X X
X X
       
     
    
              
         
     


 
   
2 \ 1\ \ 2\
2 \ 1\ \ 2\ 2 \ 1\ | 2\
, ,
, , , , ,
m m m m m m
m m m m m m m m
X X
X X X X
    
     
     
       
where \ , {1,2}i mX i , is a variable vector obtained by removing binary variable m from iX ,
while \m and \m are the associated parameter vectors.
For the endogenous binary variable 2y , the expected marginal effect on exit is 1 1 2( | , )y X X
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2[ | , , 1] [ | , , 0]E y X X y E y X X y    where
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(12)
 
 
 
 
2 1 2 2 1 2
1 1 2
2 2
, ; , ;
( | , ; ) .
X X X X
y X X
X X
     
 
            
In all cases, standard errors are computed using the delta method described by Greene (1998).
Write S with representative entry s as the parameter vector formed from joining the
parameters in , , and . Let ( ,data)k be the estimated marginal effect for the kth variable.
An estimate of the asymptotic variance for the estimated marginal effect is
(13)    1 1
ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆˆ( , , ,data) ( , , ,data)ˆ ˆˆAsy.Var. Asy.Cov. , ,S S k kk i ji j
i j
    
  
 
  
where ˆˆAsy.Cov.( , )i j is the estimated asymptotic covariance of the estimates in the recursive
bivariate probit model. Interested readers are referred to supplemental materials for more details.
Substituting into the above expression for ˆAsy.Var.( )k , we can calculate the asymptotic
variance for the estimated marginal effect. The square root gives the estimated standard error for
the estimator.
The Contract equation in (6) has conditional mean as  2 1 2 2[ | , ]E y X X X while the
recursive structure ensures that the marginal effect of some continuous variable u is simply
(14)  2 1 2 2[ | , ] ,udE y X X Xdu  
and the marginal effect of some binary variable is
(15)    2 2 2 2 \ 2\ \ 2\[ | , 1] [ | , 0] .m m m m mE y X m E y X m X X        
Standard errors for marginal effects are also calculated using the delta method, described above.
The estimation results for marginal effects are averaged across all observations. The averages,
together with their standard errors, are reported in table 4 for the Exit equation and in table 5 for
the Contract equation. The parameter estimate for the recursive bivariate probit model in table 3
identified the marginal impact of contracting on exit probability in 10 years as -0.204, while the
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average marginal result of contracting on exit decision turns out to be positive. As we shall
explain, this is because of the existence of positive correlation across unexplained variation in the
two equations. Correlation coefficient measures the correlation between the errors, where
0 suggests a positive correlation between the outcomes after the influence of the included
factors has been accounted for (Greene 2003). The estimated marginal effect shows that the
presence of contracting raises the probability of exit by about 0.02. Were 0 imposed then the
presence of contracting would decrease the probability of exit by about 0.065.
The results also show that a one-year increase in operator’s age raises the probability of exit 
by 0.01. And off-farm work by the operator or spouse raises the probability of exit by 0.08,
equivalent to an eight-year age increase. Besides direct effects on the exit decision,operator’s 
education level, facilities age, and the operation size also exert indirect effects through the
contracting decision. For these variables, both the direct and indirect effects are consistent in sign
and the direct effects account for most of the total effects.
When compared with Size2 (500-1999 inventory), the two larger size categories each have
about 0.27 greater self-assessed probability of being in business in 10 years. Based on stated
producer intentions, this result suggests that the hog industry will follow historical patterns of
continued consolidation of hog production and having larger farms account for an increasing
share of total output.
Both production scale and specialization have strong positive effects on the likelihood of
contracting (table 5). Size4 operations have a 10% higher probability of being under contract
when compared with Size2 operations. And a 1% increase in the proportion of farm revenue that
comes from hog production raises the probability of contracting by 0.36%. Having controlled for
other factors, large, specialized farms are most likely to contract. Operations with older facilities
are more likely to go out of the business in the next 10 years. A one-year increase in facilities age
increases the probability of exit by 0.3%. Together with scale and specialization effects, this
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suggests that many growers are legacy growers, rationalizing their production decisions on
existing assets and disinclined to make further investments.
When compared with completing high school only, completing a four-year degree increases
the probability of exit within 10 years by 14% and decreases the probability of contracting by
3.6%. The effect of education on contracting and exit may be subtle. Production contracts involve
a transfer of many management decisions off-farm, typically including the choice of genetic
inputs, feed rations, and marketing. Although efficiencies may be gleaned from this transfer in
control, growers who choose to contract may do so because rewards for specialization remain for
their provision of other skills, including day-to-day animal husbandry. Production under contract
may involve less demand for higher levels of general education but perhaps higher demand for
production skills that could be learned on the job (Lazear 2004). Huffman and Evenson (2001)
find some evidence that the cumulative effect of public R&D and education led to a small
reduction in specialization in the livestock sector (about 8%) during the 1950-82 period. Also,
Hennessy and Rehman (2007) find the higher education reduces the probability of entering
farming full-time.
Some general comments on the interactions between education and training, technology, and
organizational structure are perhaps in order. De-skilling is the process in which skilled labor is
replaced by a technological innovation. The idea has long been applied in the study of industrial
labor with regard to rent transfer and redundancies. More recently, it has been applied to
franchising, where concerns have been expressed that entry-level jobs neither require nor foster
the development of high skill levels. Cappelli and Hamori (2008) used United States data to argue
that the situation is more involved. While franchise routines may substitute for schooling,
franchise labor is generally provided with more on-the-job training.
These perspectives are consistent with one interpretation of education input cost efficiencies
from production contracts. Confined production and genetic uniformity as well as innovations in
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record keeping and analysis are likely to be substitutes for general animal husbandry skills.
Contracting is one, but not necessarily the only, way of unbundling production skills into a
centralized set for which scale economies can be gleaned by multiplying over production units
and another set that remains decentralized. Incentives for feed conversion efficiency and for pigs
per litter can then be used to encourage development of these remaining decentralized skills. This
would explain why more educated growers are less inclined to contract. On the demand side,
operators with stronger general education are likely better positioned to find alternative
employment. For them, jobs outside production agriculture are likely to be less physically
demanding and may reward skills that no longer carry a premium within hog production. This
would explain why educated growers are more likely to foresee exit, even having controlled for
the contract decision.
Region dummy variables, years in the hog business, and degree of operation specialization
had only indirect effects on the exit decision through the endogenous contracting variable. When
comparing to hog farms in East, those in South, North, West, and Midwest were self-identified as
more likely to go out of business in the next 10 years. Relative to East, being in the Midwest or
North increased the self-assessed exit probability by just short of 2%, while being in South or
West increased it by about 3%. The effect on the probability of contracting was much larger, but
(by construction) the pattern was the same. Midwest and North had contract probabilities about
27% lower than East whereas South and West had probabilities about 50% lower. The forecasted
geographical shift in hog production is consistent with that observed between 1992 and 2004
(Key and McBride 2007).
Contract and Exit
Some comments are in order concerning (12) above, together with the table 3 estimate of the
Contract effect in the Exit equation (-0.204 and statistically significant) and the table 4 estimated
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total marginal effect of contract in the Exit equation (+0.021 and statistically significant). There
may appear to be a contradiction in these estimates. There is not.
To confirm why, notice that table 3 also provides the estimate 1 2 1 2ˆ ˆˆCorr[ , | , ]X X  
0.142 , which is also significant. Slepian’s inequality (Tong 1980) for two random variables states 
that for 1 2( , ) a pair of bivariate normally distributed random variables with correlation then
1 1 2 2Pr[ , ; ]/ 0d a a d      for any couple 1 2( , )a a . Since the denominators in (12) are
marginal distributions and are unaffected by a change in , we need only consider the effect of a
change in on the numerators. The inequality clearly implies that
2 1 2( , ; ) / 0d X X d       . In addition, 2 1 2( , ; ) / 0d X X d       so that
1 1 2( | , ; ) / 0d y X X d   and the expected marginal effect is increasing in the correlation
between error terms. Of course when 0 then
(16)    1 1 2 1 1
0 if 0;
( | , ;0)
0 if 0.
y X X X X
   
       
Together, the above imply three scenarios.
Proposition 2. When i) 0 and 0 , then 1 1 2( | , ; ) 0y X X   ; ii) 0 and 0 , then
1 1 2( | , ; ) 0y X X   ; iii) 0 then no sign can be identified without further information.
Our case is iii), and so no sign on (12) can be identified. Available evidence identifies a
negative effect of contracting on exit. But unexplained variations are positively correlated. What
might be missing from the specification that could explain the positive correlation between 1 and
2 in (7)? A possibility is that those who take up contracting have a different set of values.
Contract production stripped of diversity in tasks as well as much of the human interaction and
management control associated with independent production may be viewed as less pleasant, and
not what one would wish to do in one’s old age. Or, although the growers see larger profits with
contracting, those who contract may eye more favorably the prospect of retirement. Another
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possibility is that many who have entered contracts have been forced to take stock of industry
trends and have provided more realistic responses to the question on exit intentions.
Conclusions
Through a formal model we have argued that hog grower types who are disposed to entering a
production contract should be less likely to exit production in the near horizon. This is likely to be
true whether grower heterogeneities arise because of differences in fixed costs of contracting,
differences in cost efficiencies that do not depend on the contracting decision, or differences in
the hazard rate that do not depend on the contracting decision. A recursive bivariate probit model
on USDA ARMS data confirms the negative impact that the act of contracting should have on
probability of exit, even after controlling for scale of production.
One implication of our findings is that the share of independent production in total production
has likely not stabilized in the United States. The remaining independent producers are likely to
either enter contract production or exit in the longer run. Of course, the inference needs to be
qualified because the hog production environment has changed dramatically in at least two ways
since the 2004 survey was completed. One is feed costs. Another regards the regulatory
environment, consumer preferences, and how the two interact. As of 2008, substantially higher
feed prices apply. In light of the large feed economies associated with contracting that were
identified in work by Key and McBride (2003), tight margins due to higher feed prices are likely
to pressure independent growers into either exiting the sector or entering contracts.
Growing demand for niche products, including organic foods, free-range animals, and meat
produced with low use of antibiotics, might provide some prospects in growth for independent
producers, who are generally smaller producers (see table 2). But while the emphasis may differ
in these production niches, future growth in these sectors of the market may well involve
production contracts. This is because both consumers and retailers want assurances that the
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production practices are as advertized. Downstream firms may impose practices and inspection
regimes through production contracts.
Non-market pressures are also being directed toward large-scale, contract-based, integrated
animal production. For example, the report of the Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal
Production(Pew Commission 2008) has recommended that “if enforcing existing antitrust laws
are not effective in restoring competition, further legislative remedies should be considered, such
as more transparency in price reporting and limiting the ability of integrators to control the
supply of animals for slaughter.” Several states have legislation in place that limits the use of
contract ownership. Although legislation emerging from social pressure will come too late to
stem the shift to contract production, increasing regulation for environmental, animal welfare,
food safety, zoonotic disease, and other concerns will involve more specialized human capital or
regulatory costs. Increased control of production processes may be best dealt with in production
contract format where compliance costs, perhaps including use of technology transfer specialists,
could be spread out over higher volumes.
An important feature of hog production markets that has received inadequate attention is
heterogeneity in the organization and scale of production enterprises across high-income
countries. The Danish hog sector has succeeded within a cooperative structure, but it is strongly
vertically integrated (Hobbs 2001). Growth and exit patterns in the United States suggest that
contract production is more cost-efficient than independent production and also may better
provide the quality of hogs the mass retail trade demands. Studies such as that of Key and
McBride (2003) have identified where many of the cost efficiencies arise. Our work has clarified
the origins of some labor cost efficiencies. But details on how organizational form affects other
efficiencies at the production process level remain to be established.
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Table 1. Description of Variables
Variable Type Explanation
Exit Endogenous 1 ifanswer to question “How many more years do you expect 
this operation wil be producing hogs?” is 10 or less
Production
Contract
Endogenous 1 if under production contract, 0 otherwise. Operations on which
hogs were produced for a cooperative or for more than one type
of production arrangement were excluded
Age Exit Years old
Off-farm Exit 1 if operator and/or spouse worked off-farm for wages/salary in
2004, including any off-farm business proprietorship, 0
otherwise
Years Contract Years operation has been in the hog production business
VPHog Contract Value of hog production over total farm value of production
East Contract North Carolina, Virginia, Pennsylvania
South Contract Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri
North Contract Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, South Dakota
West Contract Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma
Midwest Contract Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio
Education Both 1 if less than High School Diploma, 2 if High School Diploma
only, 3 if Some College, 4 if completed Four Year Degree, 5 if
Graduate School
Facilities
Age
Both Average age of hog operation’s facilities/buildings since last 
remodeling
Size1 Both Maximum hog inventory during 2004 was less than 500
Size2 Both Maximum hog inventory during 2004 in range 500-1,999
Size3 Both Maximum hog inventory during 2004 in range 2,000-4,999
Size4 Both Maximum hog inventory during 2004 was 5,000 or more
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Feeder Pig-to-Finish Hog Operations, 2004a
Producer type All
(420 Obs.)
Independent
(145 Obs.)
Contract
(275 Obs.)
Exit
(227 Obs.)
No Exit
(193 Obs.)
Variable
Exit 0.572
(0.04)
0.687
(0.060)
0.462
(0.044)
1
(0)
0
(0)
Production
Contract
0.510
(0.043)
0
(0)
1
(0)
0.412
(0.056)
0.641
(0.054)
Age 50.4
(0.659)
51.3
(1.010)
49.6
(0.790)
52.8
(0.781)
47.1
(0.909)
Off-farm 0.346
(0.038)
0.254
(0.056)
0.433
(0.044)
0.381
(0.056)
0.298
(0.052)
Years 13.1
(0.946)
17.1
(1.636)
9.3
(0.64)
14.7
(1.467)
11.1
(0.766)
VPHog 0.605
(0.033)
0.436
(0.044)
0.766
(0.021)
0.519
(0.047)
0.719
(0.031)
East 0.117
(0.016)
0.008
(0.004)
0.221
(0.029)
0.078
(0.015)
0.169
(0.030)
South 0.028
(0.008)
0.035
(0.014)
0.021
(0.010)
0.036
(0.013)
0.017
(0.009)
North 0.232
(0.042)
0.249
(0.074)
0.215
(0.042)
0.219
(0.062)
0.250
(0.054)
West 0.163
(0.041)
0.287
(0.075)
0.044
(0.014)
0.231
(0.066)
0.071
(0.023)
Midwest 0.457
(0.041)
0.417
(0.066)
0.496
(0.044)
0.431
(0.058)
0.492
(0.053)
Education 2.90
(0.097)
3.05
(0.174)
2.75
(0.070)
3.00
(0.151)
2.77
(0.085)
Facilities Age 12.4
(0.674)
14.3
(1.204)
10.6
(0.606)
14.1
(0.980)
10.2
(0.872)
Size1 0.261
(0.050)
0.414
(0.080)
0.114
(0.039)
0.400
(0.060)
0.075
(0.044)
Size2 0.349
(0.036)
0.389
(0.064)
0.311
(0.040)
0.407
(0.056)
0.271
(0.048)
Size3 0.262
(0.030)
0.153
(0.036)
0.367
(0.041)
0.140
(0.027)
0.426
(0.051)
Size4 0.127
(0.021)
0.043
(0.019)
0.208
(0.035)
0.053
(0.016)
0.227
(0.042)
a Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Parameters of Bivariate Recursive Probit
Model
Approx
Parameter Estimate t Value Pr > |t|
Exit equation
Intercept -1.432 -16.03 <0.001
Contract1 -0.204 -4.21 <0.001
Age 0.034 26.78 <0.001
Off-farm 0.260 9.84 <0.001
Education 0.221 15.88 <0.001
Facilities age 0.009 6.09 <0.001
Size2 -0.597 -16.74 <0.001
Size3 -1.443 -33.35 <0.001
Size4 -1.579 -29.41 <0.001
Contract equation
Intercept 1.205 14.75 <0.001
Years -0.051 -36.16 <0.001
VPHog 1.514 29.10 <0.001
South -1.937 -20.22 <0.001
North -1.222 -20.11 <0.001
West -2.326 -34.01 <0.001
Midwest -1.119 -19.33 <0.001
Education -0.075 -4.96 <0.001
Facilities age -0.012 -7.61 <0.001
Size2 0.031 0.83 0.404
Size3 0.211 4.84 <0.0001
Size4 0.446 8.41 <0.001
 0.142 4.38 <0.001
Ln(L) -13814
Ln( 0L ) -13823
Ln(L0) -20317
H0: 0 Statistic value 95% Critical value
Wald Test 19.15 3.84
Likelihood Ratio 18.00 3.84
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Table 4. Estimated Marginal Effects in Exit Equation
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect t-value
Contract 0.0215 0.0215 30.71
Age 0.0108 0.0108 21.60
Off-farm 0.0825 0.0825 9.71
Education 0.0694 0.0011 0.0705 15.67
Facilities age 0.0028 0.0002 0.0030 6.00
Size2 -0.1639 -0.0004 -0.1643 -20.28
Size3 -0.4320 -0.0031 -0.4351 -43.51
Size4 -0.4329 -0.0066 -0.4395 -30.95
Years 0.0008 0.0008 30.19
VPHog -0.0232 -0.0232 -15.47
South 0.0295 0.0295 26.82
North 0.0187 0.0187 20.78
West 0.0354 0.0354 59.00
Midwest 0.0168 0.0168 18.67
Table 5. Estimated Marginal Effects in Contract Equation
Total effect t-value
Years -0.012 -30.67
VPHog 0.359 35.75
South -0.451 -75.21
North -0.288 -103.05
West -0.546 -64.67
Midwest -0.258 -69.76
Education -0.018 -4.76
Facilities age -0.003 -7.39
Size2 0.007 61.22
Size3 0.050 57.79
Size4 0.104 46.24
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Appendix
Intermediate Steps Not Provided in the Main Text
Proof of Proposition 1: Commence with profit specifications (4) and (5) from the text:
(4)
( )
1 2 ( , ) 2 ( , ) 1 20
2
1 2 1 2 1 2
1
( , ) max ( ) ( ) max ( , , ; , );
( , , ; , ) ( , ; , ) ( ); ( , ; , ) ;
( )
nc rt h y t
q x x qt
V z z x z qe e dt C q x q z z
x z
x q z z x z z q C q x z z
r h z x
 
  

  

    
    
 

with attribute-conditioned optimization vector 1 2 1 2( ( , ), ( , ))
nc ncx z z q z z and
(5)
( )
1 2 3 ( , ) 2 30
( , ) 1 2 3
1 2 3 1 2 3
2
1 2
1
( , , , ) max ( ) ( )
max ( , , ; , , );
( , , ; , , ) ( , , ; , ) ( ) ;
( , , ; , ) ;
( )
c rt h y t
q x t
x q
V z z z x z qe e dt C q z
x q z z z
x q z z z x q z z q C q z
x z
x q z z
r h z x
  
 
   
  

  

     
 
    
    
 

with attribute-conditioned optimization vector 1 2 1 2( ( , , ), ( , , ))
c cx z z q z z  .
The proof demonstrates that contracting growers live in some set 1 2 3( , , )U z z z where
1 2 3 1 2 3( , , ) ( , , )z z z U z z z implies 1 2 3 1 2 3( , , ) ( , , )z z z U z z z for all 1 2 3( , , )z z zsatisfying 1 1 2,z z z  
2 3 3,z z z  . Non-contract growers live in the complement \Z U . The proof demonstrates this
partition by showing the effect along each dimension separately, i.e.,
Step A): allowing only 1z to differ while fixing the values of 2z and 3z .
Step B): allowing only 2z to differ while fixing the values of 1z and 3z .
Step C): allowing only 3z to differ while fixing the values of 1z and 2z .
Proof of Step A in Proposition 1: This is the most involved step and provides results along the
way that are used to simplify the demonstration of the other steps. The proof follows from three
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lemmas. Bear in mind that 2z and 3z are fixed throughout this step, so that the critical 1ˆz arrived
at in Lemma 3 below is conditional on the given values of 2z and 3z .
Lemma 1. For a non-contracting farm, and given the values of 2z and 3z , a larger attribute value
1z implies i) a larger output choice, 1 2 1( , ) / 0
ncdq z z dz  , and ii) a lower hazard rate,
1 1[ ( )]/ 0
ncdh y z dz  .
Proof of Lemma 1. Optimality conditions for problem (4) are
(A1)  1 2 2( , ; , ) ( ) 0; ( ) ( ) 0;q yx z z C q r h y x z h y        
with attribute-conditioned optimizating vector 1 2 1 2( ( , ), ( , ))
nc ncx z z q z z . The second-order
sufficient conditions for a maximum are satisfied since 1 2( , , , , ) ( ) 0qq qqx q z z C q    ,
2
1 2 1 2 2( , , ; , ) ( , ; , ) ( ) ( ) /[ ( )] 0xx xx yyx q z z x z z q x z h y q r h y         upon applying a first-
order optimality condition, and 1 2 1 2( , , ; , ) ( , ; , ) 0xq xx q z z x z z    , also upon applying a first-
order optimality condition.
Rewrite (A1) as
(A2)
 
1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2 2 1 2
1
[ ( , )] 0;
[ ( , )]
[ ( , )] ( , ) [ ( , )] 0.
nc
qnc
y
nc nc nc
y
C q z z
h y z z
r h y z z x z z z h y z z
 
    
A complete differentiation establishes
(A3)
  
 
 
1 2 1 2 2 1 21 2
1 1 2 2 1 2
1 21 2 1 2
2
1 1 2 11 2
1 2
[ ( , )] ( , ) [ ( , )]( , )
;
( , ) [ ( , )]
[ ( , )]( , ) ( , )1
[ ( , )] [ ( , )]
[ ( , )]
nc nc ncnc
y yy
nc nc
yy
ncnc nc
yy
nc nc
qq y
ncsign
y
n
h y z z x z z z h y z zdx z z
dz x z z z h y z z
h y z zdq z z dx z z
dz C q z z dzh y z z
h y z z
x





  

 
   
 

 1 2 2 1 2 0.( , ) [ ( , )]c ncyyz z z h y z z 
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Also,
(A4)  
1 21 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 2 1 2
[ ( , )]( , ) ( , )
0,
( , ) [ ( , )]
ncnc nc sign
y
nc nc
yy
h y z zdy z z dx z z
dz dz x z z z h y z z


   
 
so that 1 2 1[ ( , )]/ 0
ncdh y z z dz  .
While the non-contracting farm endowed with superior managerial attribute 1z will produce
more and will have a lower risk of failure at any given time, we cannot be sure of what happens to
the protective input. It is shown next, as an aside, that 1 2( , )
ncx z z can plausibly increase or
decrease with an increase in 1z .
Demonstrating that 1 2 1( , ) /
ncdx z z dz can have either sign. From (A3), 1 2 1( , ) /
sign
ncdx z z dz 
1 2 1 2 2 1 2[ ( , )] ( ( , ) ) [ ( , )]
nc nc nc
y yyh y z z x z z z h y z z    . If 0( ) yh y K e  , 0 0K  , 0 , so that the
hazard rate has Weibull form then 1 2 1 1 2 2( , ) / 1 ( ( , ) )
sign
nc ncdx z z dz x z z z     . As the optimality
condition for x in (4) asserts that 1 2( , )1 2 2 01 ( ( , ) ) / 0
ncy z zncx z z z re K      , it follows that
1 2 1( , ) / 0
ncdx z z dz  in this case. It is possible though for the derivative to be positive. If 0r
then the optimality condition requires 1 2 2 1 2 1 2( , ) [ ( , )]/ [ ( , )]
nc nc nc
yx z z z h y z z h y z z   so that
(A5)
2
1 2 1 21 2
1 2 2
1 1 2
[ ( , )] [ ( , )]( , ) Ln[ ( )]
[ ( , )] .
[ ( , )] nc
nc ncnc sign sign
yync
y nc
y y y
h y z z h y z zdx z z d h y
h y z z
dz h y z z dy 
  
While ( )h y is convex, it can be either log-concave or log-convex so that the sign of
1 2 1( , ) /
ncdx z z dz can be positive or negative.
Even if 1 2 1( , ) / 0
ncdx z z dz  , it is always true that the total level of protection, as reflected by
1 2( , )
ncy z z , increases with the beneficial exogenous attribute 1z so that the non-contracting farm’s 
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failure rate decreases with an increase in the exogenous attribute.
Lemma 2. For any given vector of grower attribute values 1 2 3( , , )z z z , a contracting farm i) uses
more of the protective input, or 1 2 1 2( , , ) ( , )
c ncx z z x z z ; ii) exhibits a lower hazard rate, or
1 2 1 2[ ( , , )] [ ( , )]
c nch y z z h y z z  ; and iii) produces more, or 1 2 1 2( , , ) ( , )c ncq z z q z z .
Proof of Lemma 2. Notice that x enters function ( )only in (4) and in (5), so the problem is
separable in that x may be viewed as being chosen to maximize the value of ( ). For
contracting farms, the optimality condition for the protection input is 1 2[ ( , , )]
cr h y z z  
1 2 2 1 2( ( , , ) ) [ ( , , )] 0
c c
yx z z z h y z z       , with derivative
(A6)  
1 21 2
1 2 2 1 2
[ ( , , )]( , , )
0.
( , , ) [ ( , )]
cc
y
c c
yy
h y z zdx z z
d x z z z h y z z

   
 
  
We may view the non-contracting farm’s choice of protective input as that where 0 , so that
(A6) implies 1 2 1 2( , , ) ( , )
c ncx z z x z z . Also, 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2( , , ) ( , , ) ( , )c c ncy z z z x z z z x z z       
1 2( , )
ncy z z so that monotonicity of the hazard function then implies 1 2[ ( , , )]
ch y z z  
1 2[ ( , )]
nch y z z . As for part iii), completely differentiate the optimality conditions for (5) to obtain
(A7)  
1 21 2 1 2
2
1 2 1 2
[ ( , , )]( , , ) ( , , )
0.
[ ( , , )] [ ( , , )]
cc c
yy
c c
qq y
h y z zdq z z dx z z
d dC q z z h y z z
 
  
 
So 1 2 1 2( , , ) ( , )
c ncq z z q z z .
This lemma demonstrates part ii) of Proposition 1, i.e., a contracting grower producers more.
Notice that Lemma 2 applies for all values of vector 1 2 3( , , )z z z . It will also be used in proving
steps B and C of Proposition 1. Next we will show that, for fixed values of 2z and 3z , managers
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with a 1z attribute above a critical level will contract while the rest will not.
3
Lemma 3. Assume all growers that are indifferent between contracting and not contracting choose
to contract. Then, for fixed values of 2z and 3z , there exists a unique attribute type 1 1ˆz z such
that all growers with 1 1ˆz z contract and all growers with 1 1ˆz z do not. Furthermore, contracting
growers produce more and have lower hazard rates, or 1 2 1 2 1 1ˆ[ ( , , )] [ ( , )]
c nch y z z h y z z z z    
1z .
Proof of Lemma 3. Indifferent types are 1 1ˆz z such that firm values under contracting and not
contracting are equal, i.e., 1 1ˆz z satisfying
(A8) 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , ).
c ncJ z z z V z z z V z z  
If expression 1 2 3( , , , )J z z z  is increasing in 1z at the least 1 1ˆz z solving (A8) then any crossing
is a unique crossing whereby high attribute types contract and low attribute types do not. The
crossing is unique because there is no 1 1ˆz z solving (A8) such that 1 1 2 3( , , , ) 0zJ z z z  , which
would allow the function to be strictly negative again.
When differentiating 1 2 3( , , , )J z z z  , use the envelope theorem on (4) and (5) to arrive at
(A9)
 
 
1
1 2 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 3 2
1 2
1 2 2 1 2 1 2
2
1 2
[ ( , ) ] [ ( , )] ( , )
( , , , )
[ ( , )]
[ ( , , ) ] [ ( , , )] ( , , )
.
[ ( , , )]
nc nc ncsign
y
z nc
c c c
y
c
x z z z h y z z q z z
J z z z
r h y z z
x z z z h y z z q z z
r h y z z

    

 


  


For
1 1 2 3
( , , , ) 0zJ z z z  at any 1 1ˆz z solving 1 2 3( , , , ) 0J z z z  , it is required to show that
3 The point of indifference, 1 1ˆz z , is assigned arbitrarily to those not contracting. If 1 2 3( , , )G z z z
has a density function, as we assume, then this assignment has no practical consequence.
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(A10)
 
 
 
1 2 2 1 2 1 2
2
1 2
1 2 2 1 2 1 2
2
1 2
[ ( , ) ] [ ( , )] ( , )
[ ( , )]
( , , ) [ ( , , )] ( , , )
.
[ ( , , )]
nc nc nc
y
nc
c c c
y
c
x z z z h y z z q z z
r h y z z
x z z z h y z z q z z
r h y z z

    

 


  


Now use the optimality conditions 1 2 1 2 2 1 2[ ( , , )] [ ( , , ) ] [ ( , , )]
c c c
yr h y z z x z z z h y z z         
0 and 1 2 1 2 2 1 2[ ( , )] [ ( , ) ] [ ( , )] 0nc nc ncyr h y z z x z z z h y z z      to write (A10) as
(A11) 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
( , ) ( , , )
.
[ ( , )] [ ( , , )]
nc c
nc c
q z z q z z
r h y z z r h y z z



 
The truth of this inequality follows from parts ii) and iii) in Lemma 2.
Since
1 1 2 3 1 1ˆ
( , , , ) 0zJ z z z z z   , the effective price to contracting growers is larger than that
to non-contracting growers and contracting growers produce more, or 1 2 1 2 1( , , ) ( , )
c ncq z z q z z z   
1 1zˆ z  . Also, 1 2 1 2( , , ) ( , )c ncy z z y z z together with 1 2 1( , , ) / 0cdy z z dz  and 1 2 1( , ) /ncdy z z dz
0 (from the reasoning in Lemma 1) implies 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2ˆ ˆ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , ) ( , )c c nc ncy z z y z z y z z y z z    
1 1 1ˆz z z    so that 2 1 2 1 1 1ˆ[ ( , , )] [ ( , )]c nch y z z h y z z z z z       .
This demonstrates part i) of Proposition 1 for larger 1z . In signing the effect on hazard rate, it
also does much of the work to demonstrate part iii) of the proposition for larger 1z . There remains
the issue of how contracting affects the exit decision. Let 1 2 3( , , , )B T z z z be a random variable in
which
(A12) 1 2 3
1 if exit by ;
( , , , )
0 otherwise.
t T
B T z z z


Define 2 3| , 1 2 3[ ( , , , ) | ]
z zE B T z z z c and 2 3| , 1 2 3[ ( , , , ) | ]
z zE B T z z z nc as the 2z and 3z conditioned
expected value of the exit indicator when the grower does and does not contract, respectively. We
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will show that
(A13) 2 3 2 3| , | ,1 2 3 1 2 3[ ( , , , ) | ] [ ( , , , ) | ].
z z z zE B T z z z c E B T z z z nc
The probability of exit by time T for a contracting grower is 1 2[ ( , , )]1 20 [ ( , , )]
cT h y z z tch y z z e dt 
1 2 1 2[ ( , , )] [ ( , , )]
0
1
c ct Th y z z t h y z z T
t
e e 
 

   while that for a non-contracting grower is 1 2[ ( , )]1 nch y z z Te .
As the heterogeneities follow distribution 1 2 3( , , )G z z z with 2z and 3z fixed, we are only
interested at this point in the conditional distribution with 2z and 3z fixed. Specify this marginal
as 2 3| , 1( )
z zG z . From Lemma 3, let set 1 1ˆ[0, ]z z denote the 2z and 3z conditioned set of non-
contracting growers while the complement set 1 1ˆ( , ]z z z
 denotes the set of contracting growers.
It follows from the definition of a set-conditioned expectation that
(A14)
   2 3 2 3
1 12 31 2 2 31 2
1
2 3 2 3
1
2 31 2
2 3
| , | ,
1 2 3 1 2 3
ˆ| ,[ ( , , )] | ,[ ( , ,)]
1 1ˆ 0
| , | ,
1 1
ˆ | ,[ ( , )]
10
| ,
( , , , ) | ( , , , ) |
1 ( ) 1 ( )
ˆ ˆ1 ( ) ( )
( )
ˆ(
c nc
nc
z z z z
z zz zh y z z T z zh y z z T
z
z z z z
z z zh y z z T
z z
E B T z z z c E B T z z z nc
e dG z e dG z
G z G z
e dG z
G z
 


        


 


1
2 31 2
1
2 3
2 3 2 31 2 1 2
| ,[ ( , , )]
1ˆ
| ,
1 1
| , | ,[ ( , )] [ ( , , )]
1 1 1 1
( )
ˆ) 1 ( )
ˆ ˆ| | .
c
nc c
z z zh y z z T
z
z z
z z z zh y z z T h y z z T
e dG z
G z
E e z z E e z z



 


         


But Lemma 3 has already established that 1 2 1 2 1 1 1ˆ[ ( , , )] [ ( , )]
c nch y z z h y z z z z z       . This
ensures that 1 2 1 2[ ( , )] [ ( , , )] 1 1 1ˆ
nc ch y z z T h y z z Te e z z z        , and so that
(A15)
   2 3 2 3
2 3 2 31 2 1 2
| , | ,
1 2 3 1 2 3
| , | ,[ ( , )] [ ( , , )]
1 1 1 1
( , , , ) | ( , , , ) |
ˆ ˆ| | 0.
nc c
z z z z
z z z zh y z z T h y z z T
E B T z z z c E B T z z z nc
E e z z E e z z 

          
This confirms inequality (A13), and so part iii) for larger 1z .
Proof of Step B in Proposition 1: Bear in mind that 1z and 3z are fixed throughout this step, so
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that the critical 2ˆz arrived at is conditional on the given values of 1z and 3z . Use the envelope
theorem on (A8) to completely differentiate and obtain
(A16)
2
1 2 1 2
1 2 3
1 2 1 2
( , , ) ( , )
( , , , ) .
[ ( , , )] [ ( , )]
c nc
z c nc
q z z q z z
J z z z
r h y z z r h y z z


 
 
If it can be shown that
2 1 2 3
( , , , ) 0zJ z z z  , then it follows that the 2 2ˆz z solving
1 2 3ˆ( , , , ) 0J z z z  is unique. But the positivity of (A16) follows from Lemma 2 since it was
shown there that 1 2 1 2( , , ) ( , )
c ncq z z q z z and 1 2 1 2[ ( , , )] [ ( , )]c nch y z z h y z z  . Consequently, from
the reasoning in Step A, 1 2 1 2 2 2 2ˆ[ ( , , )] [ ( , )]
c nch y z z h y z z z z z       . Define
1 3| ,
1 2 3[ ( , , , ) | ]
z zE B T z z z c and 1 3| , 1 2 3[ ( , , , ) | ]
z zE B T z z z nc as the 1z and 3z conditioned expected
value of exit indicator (A12) when the grower does and does not contract, respectively. It has
been shown that 1 2 1 2[ ( , )] [ ( , , )] 2 2 2ˆ
nc ch y z z T h y z z Te e z z z        , and so
(A17) 1 3 1 31 2 1 2| , | ,[ ( , )] [ ( , , )]2 2 2 2ˆ ˆ| | 0.
nc cz z z zh y z z T h y z z TE e z z E e z z          
In light of (A13)-(A15), this confirms inequality (A13) except that heterogeneities are allowed to
occur along the 2z axis rather than along the 1z axis.
Proof of Step C in Proposition 1: Again to clarify the context, bear in mind that 1z and 2z are
fixed throughout this step, so that the critical 3ˆz arrived at is conditional on the given values of 1z
and 2z . Notice that
(A18)
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , )
( , ( , ); , ) ( , , ) ( ( , , ))
( , ( , ); , ) ( , ) ( ( , )).
c nc
c c c
nc nc nc
J z z z V z z z V z z
x z z z z q z z C q z z z
x z z z z q z z C q z z
 
   

 
   
 
Now revealed preference arguments support
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(A19)
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
( , ( , ); , ) ( , , ) ( ( , , ))
( , ( , ); , ) ( , ) ( ( , ))
( , ( , ); , ) ( , ) ( ( , ))
c c c
nc nc nc
nc nc nc
x z z z z q z z C q z z
x z z z z q z z C q z z
x z z z z q z z C q z z
   
 

  
  
 
so that
(A20) 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
( , ( , ); , ) ( , , ) ( ( , , ))
( , ( , ); , ) ( , ) ( ( , ))
c c c
nc nc nc
x z z z z q z z C q z z
x z z z z q z z C q z z
   

  
 
Consequently, there exists a 3 3ˆ 0z z  such that 1 2 3 3 3ˆ( , , , ) 0J z z z z z   and 1 2 3( , , , )J z z z 
3 3ˆ0 z z  . Contracting occurs on set 3ˆ[0, )z . From the reasoning in Step A (Lemma 2),
1 2 1 2( , , ) ( , )
c ncq z z q z z and 1 2 1 2[ ( , , )] [ ( , )]c nch y z z h y z z  . So the hazard rate is smaller for
3 3ˆz z than for 3 3ˆz z . This means, that
* *
1 2 3 1 2 3[ ( , , , )] [ ( , , , )]
3 3 3ˆ
h y z z z T h y z z z Te e z z z         where
(A21) 1 2 3 3* 1 2 3
1 2 3 3
ˆ( , ) ;
( , , , )
ˆ( , , ) .
nc
c
y z z z z
y z z z
y z z z z


    
So
(A22)
* *
1 2 3 1 2 31 2 1 2[ ( , , , )] [ ( , , , )]| , | ,
3 3 3 3ˆ ˆ| | 0.
h y z z z T h y z z z Tz z z zE e z z E e z z           
In light of (A13)-(A15), this confirms inequality (A13) except that heterogeneities are allowed to
occur along the 3z axis rather than the 1z axis.
It follows from steps A-C that if 1 1z z  , 2 2z z  , and 3 3z z  then Proposition 1 is true. 
Proof of Remark 1: This is just Lemma 2, already demonstrated in Step A above. 
Demonstration of (10): First, (9) implies
(A23)
   2 1 2 2 1 21 1 2 , ; , ;[ | , ] .d X X d X XdE y X X
du du du
             
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In order to identify an expression for this derivative, specify 1 2( , )f  as some joint density with
marginals 1( )g  and 2( )h  and with conditional marginals 2 1( | )f   and 1 2( | )f   . Write
(A24)
1 2
1 2 2 1
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2
Prob , ( , )
( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( )
f d d
f d g d f d h d
 
   
     
         
 
   
 
 
   
    
          

 
so that derivatives are
(A25)
2
1
1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
1
1 1 2 2
2 1 2 1
2
Prob ,
( ) ( | ) ;
Prob ,
( ) ( | ) .
d
g f d
d
d
h f d
d


  
   

  
  



 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   


From (A25), conditioning rules for the bivariate normal, and the chain rule, it follows that
(A26)
 
   
 
   
2 1 2
2 1 1 2
1 22 2
2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 22 2
, ;
( )
;
1 1
, ;
;
1 1
u u
u u
d X X
du
X X X X
X X
d X X
du
X X X X
X X
  
         
 
  
       
 
   
                
       
   
               
       
so that (A23) may be written as
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(A27)
   
   
   
1 1 2
2 1 1 2
1 22 2
1 2 1 2
1 22 2
2 1 1 2
1 12
[ | , ]
( )
1 1
1 1
( )
1 1
u u
u u
dE y X X
du
X X X X
X X
X X X X
X X
X X X X
X X
         
 
       
 
      

                 
       
               
       
            
  
   
2
1 2 1 2
2 22 2
.
1 1
direct effect
indirect effect
u
u
X X X X
X X


       
 
     
    
                   
         


This demonstrates (10). 
Marginal effect sensitivities: For a continuous explanatory variable, z , which might appear in
1X and/or 2X , the derivatives of marginal effects (10) of z on 1y with respect to some model
parameter s are
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(A28)
      
     
 
   
2 1 1
1 1 2
2 11 2 1
2 2
,
1 2 1
1 1 2
1 1 21 2
2 2
' ' '
' '
1
' '' ' '
1 1
' ' '
' '
1
' ' '' '
1 1
s
s
s
z
s
s
X X X
X X
X XX X X
X X X
X X
X X XX X

      

      
 
   

   
 
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For a binary variable, m , which might appear in 1X and/or 2X , the derivatives of marginal
effects (11) of m on 1y with respect to s are
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For the Contract dependent variable 2y , the derivatives of marginal effects (12) with respect to
s in the Exit equation are
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By taking the derivatives of marginal effects with respect to each s we obtain each element of
 , the 14 19 covariance matrix that arises on the right-hand side of (13). Substituting into
 ˆAsy.Var. k allows us to calculate the asymptotic variance for the estimated marginal effects.
The square root gives the estimated standard error for the estimator.
The marginal effect sensitivities for the Exit equation are calculated in a similar way, but of
course the computations are less involved. In this case, the delta method provides an 11 11
covariance matrix. For (14) we obtain
(A31)    2, 2 2 2 ,s uu u
s s
X
X X X
   
 
     
 
while (15) provides
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